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Abstract
Our paper examines the origins, growth, and the development of accounting
practices and disclosures in Pakistan and the factors that influenced them.  We
traced the early days of accounting in the Indian subcontinent and the British
colonial influence over the accounting of newly independent State.  We examined
the development of accounting through three eras: 1) Independence through 1971,
2) Post 1971 – 1984, and 3) 1984 to the present.  We described how the colonial
past and later the international financial institutions such as the Asian Development
Bank and the International Monetary Fund played a key role in shaping accounting
and reporting practices of the country.  Pakistan’s adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standards as national standards in 1985 did not lead to improvement in
the quality of financial reporting.  Pakistan, though classified as a common law
country in literature exhibits most of the properties of code law countries.  We
argue that lack of investor protection (e.g., minority rights protection, insider-
trading protection), judicial inefficiencies, and weak enforcement mechanisms are
more critical factors than are cultural factors in explaining the state of accounting
in Pakistan.  We conclude that it is the enforcement mechanisms that are paramount
in improving the quality of accounting in developing economies.
Key words:  Culture, Colonial, Corporate Governance, Accounting Practices,
International Standards, Pakistan.
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On December 24, 1998 the Government of Pakistan (GOP) received a Call Notice from
the US Government for consultation regarding the establishment of quantitative restraints
on Pakistani exports of Combed Cotton Yarn (Category 301). The basis of this was an
allegation on the part of the US that the exports of Pakistan were causing verifiable harm
to the US textile sector. The legal grounds employed by the US were the Transitional
Safeguard Measures sanctioned under Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
of the WTO.1 This was the first time in the trade history of Pakistan that a case went through
all the stages of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.2 After the failure of bilateral
consultations, the first stage of the case, Pakistan had to refer its case to the Textile
Monitoring Board (TMB) and finally to the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) of the WTO.
Although the eventual outcome was in Pakistan’s favour, the pursuit of a positive
decision was a challenging task manifested by an array of problems relating to coordination
and cooperation between the public and private sector.  The objective of this case study
therefore, is not just to narrate the events which transpired in this case. It also highlights
the various obstacles faced by the government and business players in contesting the case
at each stage of the dispute settlement process.  This is done to underline the lessons that
Pakistan drew about both, its trade policy administration, and about the role and value of
the WTO in management of an important dispute.
1
Combed Cotton Yarn Exports of Pakistan to the US:
A Dispute Settlement Case*
S. M. Turab Hussain
*This study was part of “How Economies Participate” (HEP) a project commissioned by AusAid and the
WTO. I would like to acknowledge and thank Mr. Peter Gallagher of Inquit Pty Ltd. (See
http://www.inquit.com/pwg/, retrieved on September 27, 2005) for his comments and suggestions, Mr.
Akbar Sheikh, consultant to the Government of Pakistan during the dispute settlement proceedings, for
his valuable insights into the case and finally Mr. Anis-ul-Haq, Secretary APTMA for providing the
documentation on the case.
1These safeguard measures allow the establishment of quota restraints by a member country if it is ‘able
to demonstrate that a particular product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities
as to cause serious damage or actual threat to its domestic industry producing like and/or directly competitive
products.’ http://www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/textiles_02_e.htm
2The first time the US tried to impose transitional safeguard measures on Pakistani exports was in 1996.
It was on the same variety of combed cotton yarn. However Pakistan was successfully able to defend its
case at the bilateral negotiation stage and the US chose not to impose the quota restraints.2. The Problem in Context
Since 1995, there has been a worldwide increase in textile trade primarily due to the
phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) and the introduction of the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) under the WTO. Under the new regime, previously high
quota restraints on textile and clothing exports of developing countries were to be gradually
reduced to bring this sector in compliance with WTO rules. The textile sector of Pakistan
responded positively to the general reduction in quotas by the developed world. Existing
manufacturers embarked on an expansion strategy by investing in the enhancement of their
production capacity. At the same time, new manufacturers entered the industry increasing
total production and volume of exports.3 Consequently in that period Pakistan became the
second largest exporter of combed cotton yarn to the US, inadvertently, giving cause to the
US to employ transitional safeguard measures sanctioned by the ATC.
The importance of the textile sector to the Pakistan economy cannot be overstated. The
textile industry is often referred to as the backbone of the Pakistan economy. It is the
country’s largest manufacturing sector with a share of 8.5% in the nation’s GDP. The
sector’s contribution to employment is 38% and it generates a phenomenal 60% of the total
export earnings of Pakistan.4
Within the textile sector those directly affected by these quota restrictions were the
exporters and manufacturers of combed cotton yarn. These restrictions not only threatened
their individual and Pakistan’s economic well being, but also significantly increased the
skepticism of local business and government towards the West’s commitment to free trade.
As this was the second time the US had employed transitional safeguard measures, the
general feeling among business players in the post - MFA era, was that the US government
was using this as an alternative policy instrument to  protect its own textile manufacturers,
putting at stake the viability of the Pakistan textile industry.  An exporter sums up prevailing
views of business players regarding quota restraints in the following comment:
“On one hand, the West has been strongly advocating a free global market
but on the other, they are imposing such restrictions which themselves negate
their actions and deeds.”5
S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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3Information provided by Mr. Anis-ul-Haq,  Secretary All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA).
4Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 1998-99, Finance Division, Economic Adviser’s Wing,
Islamabad. (Dates relevant to the period of the case).
5 Pakistan & Gulf Economist,  August 15, 1999.Moreover, the type of role played by the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO
was of paramount importance. Notwithstanding the fact, that in 1996 Pakistan was able to
deter the US from employing the safeguard measures at the bilateral negotiations stage,
there was still skepticism amongst the local business players about the WTO. The primary
reason for this was paucity of information within the private sector about the workings and
the objectives of the WTO and a generally held notion of it being more of a representative
of western trade interests. This was an occasion, which could instill credibility of the
organization locally by relieving the prevalent doubts about its effectiveness in maintaining
the principles of free and fair trade between unequal partners.
Besides the direct economic benefits of lifting quota restraints, the importance of this
case also hinged on the legal precedent which it could potentially establish. In the words
of Akbar Sheikh, a local consultant representing the Government of Pakistan at various
stages of the case:
“The legal grounds on which the quota restrictions were imposed by the US
had to be challenged as these could have led to the establishment of a
precedent causing long-term problems not only for Pakistan but for the rest
of the developing world in future dispute settlement cases within this sector.”6
Therefore, the role of local players involved in effectively managing the case at various
stages of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO was crucial. The significance of
a positive outcome stemmed from both - restoration of local business’s confidence in the
new global trading environment and in effecting future trade policies of larger countries
such as the US.
3. The Local and External Players and their Roles
3.1 APTMA - All Pakistan Textile Mills Association
The business/industry players, both exporters and manufacturers, were represented by
the All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA). This is a broadly-based body, whose
members come from all categories and types of textile and clothing manufacturers and
traders. In 1998, when quota restraints were imposed by the US, the association had a
Standing Committee on Anti-Dumping and WTO Affairs.
S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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6The definition of domestic industry employed by the US in the case was challenged by Pakistan. This
according to Akbar Sheikh was the crucial legal definitional issue on which the entire case of the US
rested. For details see the Report of the Appellate Body, WTO. WT/DS192/AB/R. 8th Oct. 2001.The objective of this committee was initially, to coordinate with the Ministry of
Commerce in identification and hiring of appropriate consultants and lawyers to represent
Pakistan in bilateral negotiations with the US and later in dispute settlement stages of the
WTO.
Secondly, in order to facilitate the preparation and proceedings of the case, the committee
and hence APTMA had to act as a liaison between the Government of Pakistan and the
business players. This was done by providing trade and industry information to local and
international consultants representing the Government of Pakistan. Also, the committee
had to keep the members of APTMA informed about any developments in the case.
Finally, APTMA in consultation with its members and the Ministry of Commerce had
to formulate an agreeable mechanism for the payment of high legal fees involved in this
case.
3.2 The Ministry of Commerce, Pakistan
The Ministry of Commerce being the relevant ministerial arm of the GOP was directly
involved in all the stages of the case, bilateral negotiations with the US, the TMB review
and finally at the DSB. Within the Ministry of Commerce, the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) had
to coordinate with APTMA, regarding payment of legal costs incurred during the case.
At that time, there was no effective institutional framework within the Ministry of
Commerce, which could deal with WTO-related dispute settlement cases. Due to the lack
of internal expertise, the Ministry had engaged the services of a local consultant, Mr. Akbar
Sheikh. He acted as a representative of the government at the WTO along with Mr. Nasim
Qureshi, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce.
The basis of Mr. Akbar Sheikh’s selection was his past experience at the level of bilateral
negotiations and an in-depth knowledge of the textile sector of Pakistan. The role of Akbar
Sheikh was to build the defense case for Pakistan along with the international consultants
and lawyers and present it effectively at both the TMB review and the DSB stage. For this
purpose, he had to work closely with both the  Ministry of Commerce (Mr. Nasim Qureshi)
and APTMA.
3.3 The International Lawyers and Consultants
The lack of local expertise in international trade law and WTO-related issues had led
Pakistan to hire the services of international consultants and lawyers in previous dispute
settlement cases. In the 1996 combed cotton yarn case, APTMA and the GOP had hired
S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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the services of International Development Systems (IDS), a Washington-based consultancy
firm. IDS had successfully defended Pakistan’s case during the bilateral negotiations with
the US. Hence in 1998, when the US issued the call notice for the second time, APTMA
in consultation with the GOP, engaged IDS again. The consultant from IDS was Brenda
Jacobs at both the bilateral negotiations with the US and at the TMB review. Along with
IDS, another Washington-based law firm, Travis, Sandler and Rosenberg was engaged for
the TMB review.
However, once the case reached the final DSB stage, the Ministry of Commerce decided
to engage the services of lawyers based in Geneva, where the dispute settlement proceedings
of the WTO are held.
4. Challenges Faced and the Outcome
4.1 The TMB Review: At the Proceedings
After the failure of bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and the US, on March 5,
1999, the US notified the Textile Monitoring Body (TMB) pursuant to Article 6 of ATC
that it had decided to impose quota restraints for three years. This measure came into effect
from March 17, 1999. The matter was taken up at the 54th meeting of the TMB held in
April 1999.  Pakistan was represented by Mr. Akbar Sheikh, Brenda Jacobs of IDS and,
Travis, Sandler and Rosenberg.
This was apparently one of the longest cases at the TMB, lasting for around 6 days. As
mentioned earlier, this was the first time Pakistan had gone to the TMB review, hence there
was a certain degree of anxiety about the nature and result of the proceedings to follow.
According to Mr. Akbar Sheikh, the US team owing to their numbers initially looked quite
formidable. There were US government functionaries, textile experts and trade lawyers and
consultants present during the review. Moreover, the importance the US was giving to this
case was evident from the fact that the US Chief Textile Negotiator, Ambassador Don
Johnson, who is normally not required to attend such meetings, was present even during
the extended time of the sessions. The case was strongly contested by both sides as it was
clearly regarded as precedent establishing.7
7 Correspondence between Mr. Akbar Sheikh and APTMA. 16th April 1999. ( 2nd Call Notice CAT-301
Combed Cotton Yarn, APTMA Files).S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
6
The questions and discussions were found to be fairly challenging by Pakistan but
according to Mr. Akbar Sheikh they were able to rebut most of the arguments put forward
by the US side. Pakistan’s case focused on the ‘spurious’ definition of domestic industry
employed by the US and therefore on the viability of the data used to draw an alleged
causality between the imports from Pakistan and the decrease in US textile production.
The legal precedent aspect of the case was the definition of domestic industry employed
by the US. The US had defined its domestic industry as the producers of yarn for sale in
the merchant market, excluding from the data vertically-integrated producers that were
producing yarn as an intermediate good. Pakistan claimed that this definition violated Article
6.2 of the ATC, as it resulted in the US’s failure to consider its entire domestic industry.8
So after 6 long days of deliberations, arguments and counter arguments the efforts of
the Pakistan team bore fruit and the TMB accepting Pakistan’s central arguments gave a
ruling in favor of Pakistan, recommending an immediate lifting of the quota restrictions.9
 5. Behind the Scenes
The failure of the bilateral negotiations had made it evident to the GOP and APTMA
that for the US government, this was a critical case, as it could lead to the establishment
of a legal precedent which could be utilized against Pakistan at least till the duration of the
ATC.10 Moreover, Pakistan’s response to US action had to be determined and strong enough
to convey in the post – ATC era (after 2005), employing contingent measures such as anti-
dumping duties would not go unchallenged.
These important aspects, to an extent, were conveyed successfully by APTMA to the
local business players involved, exporters and manufacturers. This was reflected by their
willingness to play a proactive role during the TMB review stage.
The first example of cooperation of business players with APTMA and GOP was the
provision of relevant export and production data by the combed cotton yarn manufacturers
and exporters. This helped in the formulation of Pakistan’s defense case at the TMB review
and later also at the DSB stage.
8 For details of the case see the TMB report of the WTO.
9 The TMB concluded that ‘the United States had not demonstrated successfully that combed cotton yarn
was being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or actual
threat thereof, to its domestic industry producing like and/or directly competitive products.’ WTO
WT/DS192/1 3 April 2000.
10After 2005 the ATC expires bringing an end to all quota restraints sanctioned under different measures
such as transitional safeguards.S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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However the lack of relevant experience on the part of APTMA and absence of an
effective institutional structure in the Ministry of Commerce in terms of handling dispute
settlement cases meant that there was no set rule when it came to the payment of high legal
fees charged by the international lawyers and consultants. Hence, APTMA had the onerous
task of coming up with an acceptable formula for sharing the costs. After some
discussion/bargaining with the Ministry of Commerce it was decided in a meeting held
with the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) that 50% of the charges were to be paid by
APTMA and the other 50% by the EPB.
The 50% share of APTMA was to be divided equally between the affected members
(the exporters of combed cotton yarn) and the non-affected members of APTMA.
Willingness to share the financial burden at this stage, to some extent, reflected a
realization amongst members of APTMA of the significance of the case and its eventual
long-term benefits. The following excerpt from a letter written by one of the large
manufacturers/exporters of combed cotton yarn is indicative of the willingness to cooperate
with APTMA:
“The Textile Industry is deeply indebted to your good selves, and your
TEAM on the strong stand that you have taken to resist the imposition of
QUOTA and the steps taken by APTMA, are highly appreciable…. We
wholeheartedly support your actions, and steps taken for the waiver of
quotas, and further extend our availability for any kind of help and assistance
which is required by APTMA to take up this issue with the TMB.”
While most of the affected exporters/manufacturers of combed cotton yarn finally did
contribute their respective share, the EPB paid only 31% of their share of the costs hence
reneging from their initial commitment of paying 50% of the total costs. The shortfall in
the amount raised by APTMA resulted in a five-month delay in the payment to Travis,
Sandler and Rosenberg. The law firm charged a premium of 1.5% per month for the delay.11
11After the payment of US $32,175.00 to IDS, Washington, there were not sufficient funds left to settle the
invoice of US $28,125.16 of M/s Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A Washington. (APTMA paper on USG
Call Notice on Combed Cotton Yarn (CAT 301)).S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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Finally, the collaboration between APTMA and the Ministry of Commerce was to a
large extent facilitated by Mr. Akbar Sheikh’s good personal links with both, the Joint
Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Nasim Qureshi and the Pakistani Ambassador to
Switzerland, Mr. Munir Akram. The cooperative role played by these two government
representatives was a key reason behind the success at the TMB review. Thus in the absence
of any institutionalized coordination and collaboration between the public and the private
sector, it was individual links which mattered in achieving the positive outcome.12
6. The DSB Stage
6.1 Delay in Taking the Case up to the DSB
As the US refused to comply with the recommendation of the TMB review and even
failed to do so after their appeal was rejected in June, 1999, the only course of action left
for Pakistan was to take the case up to the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) of the WTO.
This was the final and hence, most important stage of the case, as unlike the TMB review
the decision by the panel at DSB is binding on both countries involved.  However it took
the Government of Pakistan almost an entire year to request the establishment of a panel
at the DSB. After the success at the TMB review, such a delay at this critical stage came
at a large cost to the exporter and manufacturer of combed cotton yarn. In the international
market the demand for combed cotton yarn was escalating, therefore the quota restraints
were inhibiting potential exports and foreign exchange earnings of Pakistan even further.13
Immediately after the TMB review, a meeting was held for the Standing Committee on
Anti Dumping and WTO Affairs of APTMA to provide a briefing on the proceedings at
the TMB. At the meeting, the Convener maintained that ‘in the case the US action is not
rescinded within 15 days time, GOP must apply to the Dispute Settlement Body of the
WTO.’  In August 1999, the US in a letter to TMB renewed its determination to retain the
quota restrictions thus rendering the case at the TMB review unresolved.
Following the failure of the TMB review, in September, Mr. Nasim Qureshi, Joint
Secretary, Ministry of Commerce in a letter to the chairman APTMA reiterated the decision
that both APTMA and GOP ‘may start preparation immediately for initiating the dispute
settlement process’. In the letter, it was also stated that after consultation with the Pakistan
Mission in Geneva, the Ministry had decided to hire the services of a Geneva based firm.
12 Information provided by Mr. Akbar Sheikh.
13 The Export of Cotton Yarn to the USA had increased from 599,926 Kgs in April 1999 to 2,380,545 Kgs
in Dec. 1999 (2nd Call Notice CAT-301 Combed Cotton Yarn, APTMA Files).S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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The expected total costs of preparing, filing and contesting the case of the Geneva based
firm was quoted to be $125,000 which according to the Ministry was far less than the
amount quoted by the US based law firm of $200,000.
According to Mr. Sheikh the reasons for hiring Geneva based lawyers was to avoid the
large miscellaneous charges (travel, boarding etc.) of hiring consultants based in Washington.14
Thus the reason for switching lawyers at the last stage of the case seemed purely financial.
Though the process of hiring the lawyers was to be done immediately, it was not until
March 1, 2000, that APTMA and GOP signed a contract with the Geneva based law firm,
Frieder Roessler.
Another likely reason contributing to the delay could have been the bilateral consultations
between the US and GOP during the period. There were rounds of consultation held between
the two countries in November, 1999 and then subsequently in January 2000. The hope of
getting the quota restraints lifted after bilateral negotiations might have caused the GOP
to wait for  the outcome of these talks. According to Mr. Akbar Sheikh, there were some
indications from the US side of a possibility that the quota restraints would be lifted,
therefore,  it was thought inappropriate to file a case with DSB close to the scheduled talks.
As the bilateral consultation failed, in hindsight, Mr. Akbar Sheikh felt that it could
have been a delaying tactic employed by the US. The quota restraints had been imposed
for three years, and the US was strategizing to buy time to cover as much of this period as
possible.15 Finally, in April 2000, the GOP took the case to the DSB which established a
Panel on the request of the Pakistan Government.
6.2 The Raising of Funds to Contest the Case at the DSB
As this was the first time Pakistan was contesting a case at the DSB level there was no
institutional setup or guidelines for the payment of the expenses involved. Similar to the
TMB stage, APTMA and the Ministry of Commerce had to come up with an agreement.
APTMA’s proposal of a cost-sharing formula was finally accepted in February 2000 by the
Ministry of Commerce. It was decided that out of the estimated total cost of $125,000,
14 The actual charges of the Geneva based law firm, Frieder Roessler were approx US $60,000. The expected
amount quoted by the government must have been inclusive of the miscellaneous expenditures, i.e., travel,
boarding etc. of the government consultants and representatives. (2nd Call Notice CAT-301 Combed
Cotton Yarn, APTMA Files).
15 Information provided by Mr. Akbar Sheikh.S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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APTMA was to contribute the first $50,000 and the remaining balance had to be given by
the EPB using the revenue generated from the Export Development Fund (EDF).16
The next stage for APTMA was to get the concerned exporters/manufacturers to
contribute their share in order to raise the agreed initial amount of $50,000. Unlike the
TMB stage, there was a problem within APTMA in motivating the concerned business
players to contribute a second time for the legal expenses at the DSB stage.
There were some large manufacturers/exporters of combed cotton yarn who saw beyond
their immediate economic interest and understood the value of persisting with the case at
this last and most important stage. These players were willing to contribute whatever was
required of them. Simultaneously, there were others who had contributed at the TMB stage,
but due to a lack of understanding of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and frustration
owing to US non-compliance, saw no reason to contribute in order to pursue the case further.
It is safe to say that these players did not quite appreciate the significance of the case
in terms of the long-term benefits of pursuit for a positive decision till the end. The following
excerpts are an example of the degree of divergence of views within members of APTMA:17
Excerpts from a letter by a cooperating large manufacturer/exporter to APTMA:
“Pakistan must move its case to the Dispute Settlement Board. In my opinion
however expensive and cumbersome these processes maybe, we must do
our utmost to fight these cases to protect our existing and potential markets.
In this connection I would request you to call a meeting of the concerned
members to develop a strategy to contest the above case.”
Excerpts from a letter by a non-cooperating large exporter/manufacturer to APTMA:
“Please note that we already are the largest quota holders in this category
from Pakistan. It is not in our interest to have this quota removed as its
imposition creates a barrier to entry for others. It does not make any economic
sense for us to ‘pay to cut our own feet’. We therefore feel that it is unjust
for APTMA to ask us to pay for this contribution.”
16 The Export Development Fund (EDF) is collected by the government (The EPB) by charging the exporters
a certain proportion of their export earnings.
17 2nd Call Notice CAT-301 Combed Cotton Yarn, APTMA Files.18 The panel consisted of the Chairman and two members, one from the EU and the other from India.
19 For details of the panel’s decision see the WTO, Panel Report. May 31, 2001.
S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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These financing problems were eventually resolved and APTMA was able to meet its
commitment of paying the initial $50,000 of the cost incurred at the DSB. In the words of
Mr. Akbar Sheikh on the issue of financing at the DSB:
“Such disagreements within the association are quite common and thus were
anticipated. The important thing was that in the end the business players,
APTMA and the Government got together to contest the case successfully
at the DSB.”
6.3 The Proceedings
The first hearing of the case was held in Geneva on November 16-17, 2000 and the
second hearing on December 13-14, 2000. The hearings were before the three-member
panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body of WTO.18 A three-member team consisting
of Mr. Akbar Sheikh, Mr. S.I.M Nayyar (Counsellor, Pakistan Permanent Mission in
Geneva), and Mr. Frieder Roessler represented Pakistan. A ten-member team represented
the US government. According to Mr. Akbar Sheikh the proceedings of the DSB were quite
different from those at the TMB review. While at the TMB there was a lot of discussion
and argument, at the DSB there was more paper work. Questions during the hearings were
focused on the written submissions by the US and Pakistan. Pakistan successfully contested
the case and finally on May 31, 2001 the Panel in its report recommended an immediate
lifting of the quota restrictions by the US.19
The US appealed against the decision on July 9, 2001. The hearing of the appeal was
held on  August 16, 2001 in which, the panel upheld its earlier decision and recommended
an immediate lifting of the quota restraints.
Finally, complying with the recommendations of the DSB and the Appellate Body of
the WTO, the US government in November 2001 lifted the quota restriction on Pakistani
imports much to the relief of Pakistani manufacturers and exporters. The whole process,
from the day the quota restraints were imposed to the day these were lifted, lasted for almost
two years and nine months covering almost the entire period of the three-year transitional
safeguard measure – quota restraint employed by the US. The following comment by20 Mr. Nasim Qureshi, who was the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, during most of the duration of
case was appointed as the deputy chief of the Pakistan Mission in Geneva and head of this new WTO cell.
This cell was created right at the end of this particular case hence being at its inception stage could not 
play any substantive role in helping with the proceedings of the case.
21http://dawn.com/2000/10/08/ebr9.htm
S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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Mr. Akbar Sheikh, after being congratulated by Ambassador Don Johnson for winning the
case, aptly summarizes the feeling at that time:
“At the end of the day both parties (the USA and Pakistan) won. Pakistan
because it got a decision in its favour and US because it was able to keep
the quota restraints for almost the entire three-year period, thanks to the
duration of the case.”
7. Lessons Learnt
7.1 The Government
The first major lesson which came out of the case was that the Government of Pakistan
should in future, play a much more proactive role in trade-related disputes than it has done
in the past. In this particular case, the primary factor behind the relatively good degree of
coordination and cooperation between the Ministry of Commerce and APTMA (business
players) had been the good personal links, which Mr. Akbar Sheikh enjoyed with the two
important functionaries in the government – the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce
and the Pakistani Ambassador to Switzerland. There was an absence of any institutionalized
coordination between the GOP and APTMA specifically relating to such trade disputes and
WTO affairs.
Mr. Akbar Sheikh was of the view that in order to facilitate institutional level coordination
in WTO-related dispute settlement cases the government should have a properly functioning,
effective cell within the Ministry of Commerce.  The government seemed to have learnt
that lesson right at the start of the DSB proceedings in Geneva. In October 2000, just before
the DSB hearings, a WTO cell was established at the permanent mission office in Geneva.20
The cell was created to ‘safeguard Pakistan’s export and other interests in international
trade by communicating the changes in the system and rules to the relevant authorities in
Pakistan.’ 21S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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The Ministry of Commerce almost simultaneously opened a WTO wing which now has
a functioning cell. This cell has six working groups on different agreements on WTO.22
Although these steps by the GOP are in the right direction, Mr. Akbar Sheikh was of
the view that there is still room for improvement in developing an effective institutional
framework to contest future dispute settlement cases. He pointed out that the WTO cell
should provide appropriate guidelines on both trade-related and dispute settlement issues
to the players involved. Research should be conducted within the cell to keep it up to date
with the current dispute settlement cases around the world. At the same time the cell should
maintain an archive of past cases and rulings. According to Mr. Akbar Sheikh, this would
be immensely helpful to the private and the public sector in developing the right strategy
to contest future cases.
One of the central problems in this cotton yarn dispute case was the hiring of expensive
foreign consultants and lawyers. According to Mr. Akbar Sheikh, the type of research which
some of these firms produced could have been very easily done locally had there been some
basic level of expertise relating to legal issues within international trade and WTO. He
suggested that the government should invest in the training of lawyers and consultants who
in the future could handle dispute cases without the government resorting to the hiring of
expensive foreign firms.
7.2 APTMA
During the course of this case, APTMA already had a committee on Anti-Dumping and
WTO issues which was supposed to act as a liaison between the business players and the
GOP.  However, as mentioned before, it had been the personal links which Mr. Akbar
Sheikh had with both the GOP and APTMA which largely facilitated the coordination and
cooperation between the two. In order to rectify the lack of effective institutional infrastructure,
APTMA has recently opened a WTO Cell, which according to The Secretary APTMA, Mr.
Anis-ul-Haq, is still in its formative stage. The Cell has currently hired a law firm, which
advises the APTMA members regarding WTO issues. According to Mr. Anis-ul-Haq, the
primary objective of the Cell should be to coordinate with the parallel WTO cell at the
Ministry of Commerce so that future dispute cases are handled smoothly. Also, this Cell
should advise the concerned members of APTMA on the prevailing trade environment and
international trade law so as to preempt any action taken internationally against the local
business players.
22According to the 2002 Trade Policy Review of Pakistan by the WTO, these steps by the GOP to change
and modify the existing institutional framework have strengthened the Ministry of Commerce in dealing
with future trade related issues.S.M. Turab Hussain / CMER Working Paper No. 05-36
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A major problem in this cotton dispute case was the collection of funds to meet the
expenses involved. Both Anis-ul-Haq and Akbar Sheikh were of the opinion that rather
than the existing ad-hoc case by case approach there should be some set criteria established
by the Government and APTMA when it comes to the payment mechanism. This would
significantly reduce the costs in terms of time wasted in coming up with an acceptable
distribution of the financial liability. Along with this, APTMA as an organization should
have a pool of resources allocated specifically for meeting the expenses of future dispute
settlement cases. This common resource pool could be generated if APTMA helps in
developing and fostering the concept of mutual insurance amongst its members who often
because of conflicting interests are not willing to contribute.
7.3 The Business Players
The positive and effective role played by the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO
in resolving this trade dispute between two unequal partners helped re-invigorate the
confidence of the local business players in the global trading environment. According to
Mr. Akbar Sheikh, it also helped in improving the image of the WTO at the level of both
the government and business and enhanced its credibility as an institution aimed at fostering
free and fair trade.
However, the fact still remains that the quota was rescinded just three months before
the expiry of the three-year period of the safeguard measures. Thus, the cost to the local
business player was not just in terms of contesting the case but also in the form of the lost
revenue/earnings due to the prolonged restraints. The fact that at the DSB stage quite a few
business players initially refused to participate in financing the case indicates a prevalent
frustration with the prolonged duration of the dispute settlement process. There was also
a certain amount of skepticism about the ability of the WTO to make countries like the US
comply with its recommendations and decisions. Finally, there was a general feeling that
after the DSB decision there was no guarantee that the US would comply as it could not
be credibly threatened into compliance by a small economy like Pakistan even if retaliatory
measures were sanctioned by the WTO.CMER Working Paper Series
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After giving an overview of the state of migration policy in developing countries
with special reference to Pakistan this paper essentially revisits the issue of policy
and its effect on rural to urban migration under an extended family theoretical
framework. This specific approach is motivated by empirical literature on migration
in the context of developing countries which suggests the emergence of spatially
separated but economically linked rural and urban households - expanded or
extended families. The extended family in this paper consists of two households,
the rural-origin and its urban-migrant offshoot. The migrant after leaving the
countryside joins relatives in the city who through the assumption of income sharing
within households sustain the migrant in case of unemployment. The economic tie
linking the two households is remittances flowing from the migrants to the family
members left behind. All decisions, migration and remittance, are based on altruism
rather then self-interest. Thus in the model both migration and remittances are
endogenously determined. This extended family framework is then employed to
analyze the effect of the standard policy prescriptions, i.e., urban employment
subsidy and a rural income subsidy on migration and urban employment. Also, the
welfare effect of a subsidy transfer from urban to rural sector is analyzed. The
results, especially in the case of the rural subsidy provision, are qualitatively
different from those in the standard Harris-Todaro type literature on migration
suggesting the sensitivity of predicted policy effects on the type of methodology
employed.
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